When do interest groups contact bureaucrats rather than politicians? Evidence on fire alarms and smoke detectors from Japan by Scheiner, E et al.
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Previously Published Works
Title
When Do Interest Groups Contact Bureaucrats Rather than Politicians? Evidence on Fire 
Alarms and Smoke Detectors from Japan
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3hs8d39g
Journal
JAPANESE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 14(3)
ISSN
1468-1099
Authors
Scheiner, Ethan
Pekkanen, Robert
Muramatsu, Michio
et al.
Publication Date
2013-09-01
DOI
10.1017/S146810991300011X
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems
Author(s): Megumi Naoi and  Ellis Krauss
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 874-892
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20647956
Accessed: 30-09-2017 04:57 UTC
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to American Journal of Political Science
This content downloaded from 137.110.36.192 on Sat, 30 Sep 2017 04:57:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics
 under Alternative Electoral Systems
 Megumi Naoi University of California, San Diego
 Ellis KrauSS University of California, San Diego
 Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? We theorize lobbying venue choices and
 intensity as a function of contract enforceability with policy makers, politicians, or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational
 structures of interest groups, in particular, whether they are centralized or decentralized, substantially affect their lobbying
 strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy makers and punish
 them when they fail. We further demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus decentralized structure on venue choices
 is conditional on the types of electoral system: majoritarian, semiproportional (single, nontransferable vote: SNTV), or
 proportional representation systems. We test this argument using longitudinal survey data on lobbying which span two
 decades and cover around 250 interest groups in various sectors and issue areas in Japan. The results lend strong support to
 our argument about contract enforceability under alternative electoral systems.
 How do interest groups choose across different
 venues of lobbying to influence policy? Why do
 some interest groups lobby politicians and oth
 ers lobby bureaucrats? These questions lie at the heart
 of much of the classic literature in political economy,
 ranging from Madison and the Federalist Papers and
 Dahls seminal study of pluralism in New Haven (Dahl
 1963) through studies of corporatism (e.g., Schmitter &
 Lehmbruch 1979) to the collective action literature (e.g.,
 Olson 1965). Yet the existing literature on lobbying tends
 to ask to what extent interest groups influence policy
 rather than a question of how they attempt to influence
 it. In particular, the question of venue selection, i.e., how
 interest groups choose across multiple venues of lobbying,
 has not been explored extensively to date.
 In contrast to the existing approaches that the
 orize interest groups' goals of lobbying as changing
 legislators' preferences or their policymaking resources
 (Hall and Deardorff 2006; McCarty and Rothenberg
 1996; Walker 1991), we theorize lobbying as a func
 tion of contract enforceability with policy makers,
 politicians, or bureaucrats. We argue that the orga
 nizational structures of interest groups, in particular,
 whether organizational structures are centralized or de
 centralized, substantially affect their choice of lobby
 ing strategies because they are associated with differ
 ent ability to monitor and enforce contracts with pol
 icy makers and punish them when they fail. We fur
 ther demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus
 decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional
 on the types of electoral system: majoritarian, semipro
 portional (single, nontransferable vote: SNTV), or
 proportional representation systems. Under a highly
 personalistic electoral system like SNTV, decentralized
 groups are more likely to go to a political route as they
 are better able to monitor, enforce, and punish individ
 ual legislators in a district than centralized groups. Under
 a party-centered electoral system, such as a closed-list
 Megumi Naoi is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
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 proportional representation system, centralized groups
 are more likely to go to a political route as they are better
 able to enforce and punish politicians via political parties.
 We leverage the case of Japan to test how interest
 group organizations and electoral institutions interact to
 shape lobbying strategies for two reasons. First, it is ad
 vantageous because the electoral reform occurred with
 out a major partisan change (Horiuchi and Saito 2003).
 Second, postwar Japan provides a laboratory of electoral
 systems because it has employed SNTV (pre-1994) and
 majoritarian systems combined with proportional repre
 sentation systems (post-1994). We use a longitudinal elite
 survey data set of a large sample of interest group lead
 ers at three data points spanning a quarter of a century.
 We demonstrate that interest groups adapt their lobby
 ing strategies to the change in electoral institutions in
 which they are embedded. Our argument proceeds in two
 steps.
 First, we theorize interest groups' lobbying venue
 choices and intensity as an effort to enforce and monitor a
 contract with politicians and hypothesize how various or
 ganizational structures of interest groups are linked with
 their potential ability to make politicians commit to this
 contract. When the interest groups' organizational struc
 tures allow more effective monitoring and punishment of
 politicians who fail to commit (i.e., not to reelect or with
 draw financial contributions), they are more likely to go to
 a political route. When their organizational structures do
 not allow effective monitoring and punishment of politi
 cians who shirk or renege, they are more likely to go to a
 bureaucratic route to influence an earlier formulation or
 implementation stage of policymaking.
 Second, organized interests use various instruments
 to punish politicians who shirk or renege on the contracts:
 votes, candidate endorsement, and campaign contribu
 tions are the major examples. We construct typologies
 of these punishment mechanisms into decentralized and
 centralized instruments and discuss how the effectiveness
 of various instruments changed due to the 1994 elec
 toral reform. We expect that the electoral reform from
 an SNTV system with multimember districts to a mixed
 SMD/PR system decreases the effectiveness of the decen
 tralized punishment mechanism (voting in a district or
 candidate endorsement) while it increases the effective
 ness of the centralized punishment mechanism (voting
 for a party). Thus, the reform is expected to diminish the
 difference between decentralized and centralized groups'
 lobbying strategies. We find that our organizational struc
 ture argument explains variations across interest groups
 as well as changes after the electoral reform controlling
 for their organizational resources and for sectoral issue
 areas.
 Theories of Lobbying Venue Choices
 Why do some interest groups lobby politicians, while oth
 ers lobby bureaucrats? The question is at the heart of
 why interest groups lobby. Two schools of thought have
 emerged in the literature on the United States: one that
 theorizes the interest groups' goals of lobbying as chang
 ing or enhancing policy makers' preferences ("preference
 centered approach") and another that theorizes lobbying
 as a function of organizational resources of interest groups
 or legislators ("resource-centered approach").
 Preference-Centered Approach:
 Exchange and Persuasion
 The preference-centered approach views organized inter
 ests' lobbying as an effort to change or align their pref
 erences with legislators to achieve policy goals. In this
 approach, the two mediums that organized interests use
 to shape legislators' preferences are money and infor
 mation. One argument, which is referred to as exchange
 theories, focuses on the role of campaign contribution in
 buying support from legislators. While the debates re
 garding what organized interests seek to buy?votes, ac
 cess, or time of legislators?have advanced the literature,
 the exchange theories still suffer from three major issues.
 First, without a third-party enforcement or punish
 ment, how do legislators and organized interests commit
 to this quid quo pro exchange? The literature suggests
 that in such a "political market failure," exchanges be
 tween legislators and organized interests are tacit, supra
 legal, and intertemporal in their nature and thus are
 susceptible to legislators' reneging and shirking (Hall
 and Deardorff 2006; McCarty and Rothenberg 1996;
 Snyder 1992; Stokes 2005; Weingast and Marshall 1988).
 Yet empirical research on how legislators and organized
 interests seek to solve this political market failure is few
 and far between.
 Second, the empirical support for the money-buys
 votes argument is weak in light of the findings that in
 terest groups are much more likely to lobby their allies
 than swing legislators or enemies (Bauer, Pool, and Dex
 ter 1963; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). This empirical
 regularity not only holds in the context of the United
 States but also in Japan (Muramatsu and Kume 2006;
 Sasaki et al. 1999).1 Stratmann (1998) also finds that a
 lrThe 2003 survey used in this article (see the "Data and Method"
 section below for a detailed description of these surveys) also re
 veals that only 2.1% of interest group leaders choose "campaign
 contribution" as the most important reason for why legislators as
 sist their groups, which suggests that organized interests seem not
 to be "buying" legislators' votes, access, or time.
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 surprisingly small amount of money is at stake to buy
 legislators' votes in the United States. If the purpose of
 lobbying is to change legislators' preferences, why would
 interest groups waste lobbying efforts on their core sup
 porters? Finally, the exchange theory does not account
 for why interest groups extensively lobby bureaucrats: the
 2003 survey done by the Muramatsu-Kume group reveals
 that interest groups spend approximately 60% of their
 lobbying efforts (i.e., frequency of personal contacts) with
 bureaucrats compared to 40% with politicians. With their
 focus on the role of money in changing legislators' pref
 erences, the exchange theories do not help us understand
 why interest groups lobby bureaucrats at all.
 Another argument, which is referred to as persua
 sion theories, theorizes information transmission from
 organized interests to policy makers as a mechanism to
 enhance?rather than to change?policy makers' prefer
 ences (Austen-Smith 1993, 1994; Hansen 1991; Wright
 1996). This approach views information asymmetry be
 tween legislators and organized interests as a key determi
 nant of lobbying and explains several anomalies found in
 the exchange theories, such as why interest groups lobby
 allies more than swing legislators and why interest groups
 lobby bureaucrats. Moreover, unlike the exchange theo
 ries in which "the money, not information or arguments
 of the lobbyist, is the variable doing the behavioral work"
 (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 71), the persuasion theories
 model the lobbying process more directly as informa
 tion transmission via personal contacts and deliberations
 (Wright 1990).
 Its weakness, however, is twofold. First, due to the
 difficulty in systematically studying the process of pri
 vate information transmission, empirical tests of these
 theories have lagged far behind the theories (exceptions
 are Furlong 1998; Golden 1998; Yackee and Yackee 2006).
 Second, the persuasion theories assume that legislators
 face uncertainty about constituents' positions on a given
 policy, and this uncertainty makes them rely on informa
 tion provided by organized interests. This logic, however,
 does not account for why interest groups often lobby bu
 reaucrats who do not face this need to learn constituents'
 positions.2
 Finally, neither exchange nor persuasion theories
 help us understand the prevailing patterns in the United
 States, Japan, or elsewhere in which interest groups lobby
 legislators with whom they have a long-standing relation
 ship. The 2003 Muramatsu-Kume Survey reveals that the
 highest proportion of leaders (30%) say legislators assist
 their groups because they agree with the group s goal or
 policy, 17% say it is because they have a long-term trust
 worthy relationship with a group, and 13% say legislators
 assist their groups because they provide organized votes
 during elections. Only less than 10% say it is because the
 group provides information. What, then, does it mean to
 be "persuaded"?
 Resource-Centered Approach
 Contrary to the preference-centered views discussed
 above, Hall and Deardorff (2006) propose a novel,
 resource-centered argument. Direct lobbying, they ar
 gue, is a gift from organized interests to like-minded
 legislators in forms of information and subsidy to as
 sist resource-scarce legislators to work at achieving a
 policy. The lobbying-as-subsidy theory solves many
 anomalies found in light of preference-centered ap
 proaches: why interest groups lobby allies more than
 swing legislators, and why legislators often initiate con
 tacts with organized interests. Yackee and Yackee (2006)
 demonstrate that not just elected representatives, but also
 bureaucrats are more likely to respond to big business
 interests than citizens as the former provide better qual
 ity information about complex policy issues. This line of
 research suggests that the goal of a group s lobbying with
 bureaucrats and politicians might be more similar than
 thought (Niskanen 1975).
 Walker (1991) proposes another resource-centered
 model of lobbying. He argues that interest groups' access
 and proximity to elites in the Capitol versus local political
 actors in a district determine their lobbying strategies.
 Localized groups are more likely to use "outside" lobby
 ing strategies (i.e., mobilize grassroots organizations and
 the public), while centralized groups are more likely to
 work through elites such as legislators and federal agen
 cies ("inside" strategies; Kollman 1998). Holyoke (2003)
 accounts for the venue choices by looking at the distri
 bution of power between proponents and opponents of a
 given policy in venues. In de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo
 (2002), interest groups' choices among lobbying legisla
 tive, administrative, and legal institutions are determined
 by the ideology of the court and the responsiveness of the
 court to resources. These resource-centered approaches
 have an advantage over the preference-centered approach
 because they simultaneously account for organized in
 terests' venue choices and intensity of lobbying. Yet the
 puzzle still remains: how do interest groups cope with the
 risks of wasting their lobbying resources when legislators
 face incentives to renege or shirk on promises?
 Similar to Walker, we link centralized versus de
 centralized interest groups with their venue choices.
 2 The argument also does not account for why some legislators
 spend time meeting with interest groups that are not necessarily
 from their districts, such as public interest environmental groups
 and international NGOs.
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 However, our approach departs from Walker's in two ma
 jor respects. First, we focus on organizational structure
 rather than resources. We define decentralized organiza
 tional structures as local organizations' potential ability
 to make independent political decisions from the cen
 tral headquarters, such as candidate endorsement, vote
 switching, and campaign contribution. We demonstrate
 that even controlling for various measures of access and
 resources, our contractual approach better accounts for
 lobbying patterns. Second, in general, electoral institu
 tions are missing from the lobbying literature. We analyze
 how organizational structures of interest groups interact
 with electoral institutions to shape their venue choices.
 Lobbying as Contract Enforcement
 We model interest groups' lobbying venue choices and
 intensity as a function of their contract enforceability
 with policy makers. Our contractual approach theorizes
 interest groups' goal of lobbying as an effort to enforce a
 contract with legislators who are already sympathetic to
 their preferred policies. Our approach accounts for major
 puzzles about interest group lobbying in general and in
 Japan in particular: why do interest groups predominantly
 lobby legislators who are already sympathetic to their
 policy; why do they lobby legislators with a long-standing
 relationship; and why do some groups lobby politicians
 while others lobby bureaucrats?
 Policymaking Environment: Electoral
 Institutions and Legislative Organizations
 To account for the major puzzles described above, we need
 to understand incentives of both the supply (legislators)
 and demand side (organized interests) of lobbying. There
 are two institutional characteristics that shape legislators'
 incentives to form, renege on, or shirk the contract with
 special interests in Japan: electoral institutions and leg
 islative organization (i.e., a committee system). In Japan,
 under the SNTV system in which district magnitude gen
 erally ranged from one to five, same-party candidates of
 the largest ruling party, the Liberal Democrats, competed
 for a seat. The SNTV system encourages individual legis
 lators to cultivate "personal votes" rather than to collec
 tively pursue a coherent party label (Cox and Thies 1998;
 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1994, and many others). More
 over, since votes that individual legislators win in a dis
 trict are not transferable to other same-party candidates,
 individual legislators have incentives to specialize either
 geographically (Hirano 2006) or sectorally (McCubbins
 and Rosenbluth 1995) to differentiate themselves from
 other same-party candidates (Tatebayashi 2004). Thus,
 under an SNTV system, legislators' incentives were to tar
 get narrow constituents ("specialization") as opposed to
 building a majoritarian coalition with broader and more
 diverse constituents.
 Legislative organizations also mirror legislators' per
 sonal vote incentives. The LDP's policymaking organi
 zation under an SNTV system was decentralized and
 specialized. The party decided policies through an ex
 tensive committee system (Policy Affairs Research Coun
 cil; PARC), each of which oversaw corresponding cabinet
 ministries and bureaucratic agencies (Cox and Rosen
 bluth 1995).3 The decentralized committee system also
 gave policymaking power to party backbenchers who
 needed to credit-claim to special interests to mobilize
 votes and campaign contribution (Rosenbluth and Mc
 Cubbins 1995, 49). Accordingly, organized interests have
 incentives to lobby individual legislators in a district,
 rather than lobbying through a party or party leaders. This
 decentralized political structure lowers the enforceability
 of contract between legislators and centralized organized
 interests. First, individual legislators have incentives to
 pursue their individual platform, and the party does not
 function as an enforcer of a contract. Second, because
 the PARC employs unanimity rules and the meeting is
 not open to the interest groups or the public,4 organized
 interests have difficulty identifying who opposes versus
 who supports a policy at the PARC meetings or any con
 tribution made during the meetings.5 This is one of the
 consequences of the one-party dominant, policymaking
 environment before 1994 in which major policy decisions
 were made within the ruling party rather than in the Diet.
 This means that centralized groups without local organi
 zations have difficulty monitoring and acquiring infor
 mation about the extent to which politicians commit and
 3 Because the LDP was the ruling party for all but 10 months since
 1955, essentially the basic content of policies was decided within
 the LDP and only sometimes revised or slightly modified in the
 Diet (parliament) committees. Thus the LDP's PARC was the more
 important policymaking organ for the government.
 4 Interest groups can only attend the meetings if they are officially
 invited for hearings.
 5 Organized interests have two ways to deal with this lack of trans
 parency at the PARC: one is to rely on media reporters who outside
 the meeting rooms usually peep in and try to overhear the PARC
 meetings from open doors, and another is to rely on self-reported
 stories about the meetings told by politicians (for instance, many
 politicians leak PARC debates on their blogs). These methods fall
 short, however, as the media only covers debates surrounding major
 legislations and politicians can exaggerate their contribution.
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 contribute to realizing their preferred policy.6 As a re
 sult, contract enforcement, monitoring, and punishment
 mechanisms have to be decentralized and localized so that
 interest groups can hold individual politicians account
 able to their promises.
 Decentralized Lobbying as Contract
 Enforcement under SNTV
 Under the SNTV system described above, politicians and
 organized interests exchanged promises during the elec
 tion campaigns, but these contracts were susceptible to
 legislators' reneging and shirking. Organized interests
 used various instruments to reduce wasting their lobbying
 efforts, such as ex ante contracts and ex post punishment
 and rewards.
 Anecdotes suggest that legislators and special inter
 ests form such ex ante contracts in Japan. Aurelia George
 Mulgan describes what a politician who specialized in the
 agricultural sector had to go through to get the endorse
 ment of a major agricultural group:
 For Matsuoka to receive electoral support from
 the prefectural nouseiren (Agricultural Politics
 Association), he had to demonstrate sympathy
 for, and understanding of, the organisation's
 agricultural policy campaigns (nousei undou)
 and to make a public promise of adherence to
 a position that would reflect the intentions of
 Noukyou (Agricultural Cooperatives) along with
 farmers in politics. In exchange for recommen
 dation and authorisation (kounin mo suishin
 mo), he would have to sign a policy agreement
 with the organisation and become a staunch
 friend (meiyuu) of the league.7 (2006,61; English
 translation in parentheses added by authors)
 Ex post monitoring and rewards for loyalty also
 exist. Woodall (1996) documents that the large con
 struction firms graded the politicians' contributions to
 delivering their preferred policy and rewarded those with
 good grades with larger biannual campaign contribution
 (Woodall 1996, 114).
 Other anecdotes abound suggesting that politicians'
 shirking may well be punished by organized interests.
 In 1979, local Agricultural Cooperatives (Noukyou) in
 Aomori and Akita prefectures decided to switch their en
 dorsement from the LDP to the Japan Communist Party
 candidates for the lower-house election. The head of the
 Agricultural Cooperatives in Akita prefecture said:
 There was only one (LDP) lower-house represen
 tative from Akita prefecture who attended our
 big meeting to discuss the issue of rice price last
 year. It showed the serious lack of interests of
 Akita (LDP) representatives in helping farmers
 out. We were very frustrated. Except for one,
 all of our 19 committee members for the can
 didate endorsement were conservatives (i.e., the
 LDP supporters). But we decided to endorse Mr.
 Nakagawa (of the JCP) who has worked hard
 for us_This was very effective?after the elec
 tion, the LDP politicians treat us much better
 when we lobby them. Their attitudes completely
 changed. (Interview documented in Tachibana
 1984, 352-53. Translation by the authors. Paren
 theses added by authors)
 The above examples illustrate the importance of our
 contractual approach. Even special interest politicians?
 those who are already sympathetic to given organized
 interests?can renege on the contract with interest groups
 or shirk on the effort to realize a policy. Incentives to
 renege or shirk can be political (e.g., the party orders
 them to do otherwise or there are conflicts of interest in a
 district; see fn. 8) or efficiency driven (e.g., allocate their
 resources to mobilize swing voters, while keeping the core
 constituents' votes), but either way, such incentives may
 be prevalent as seen in the above episode.
 Organized interests use various ways to reduce the
 risk of such political market failure.8 The first is gather
 ing and distributing information about politicians' levels
 of commitment to a given special interest. The above
 6On the other hand, bureaucrats' meetings on policy issues with
 Advisory Councils (shingikai) where the majority of policy bills
 are first formulated are generally open to the public. In addition,
 transcripts of discussions are also available to the public online at
 ministries' websites. Furthermore, Japanese bureaucrats are not po
 litically appointed, either; almost all are selected by particular min
 istries after passing examinations and work for the same ministry
 until their retirements except for brief stints at other agencies. Thus
 the only potential source of shirking by bureaucrats, in addition to
 "laziness," is the divergence between politicians' and bureaucrats'
 policy preferences ("agency slack" problem which can be taken care
 of through politicians' and interest groups' "fire alarms").
 7Matsuoka eventually became Minister of Agriculture in the first
 Abe Cabinet, but investigations into his misuse of finances as a Diet
 Member led him to commit suicide in May of 2007.
 8 The most drastic solution to this contractual problem is to send
 their own members to the Diet (Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya
 2008). The head of Agricultural Cooperative in Miyazaki prefecture
 said: "We need to send our own people to the Diet-The LDP's
 self-claimed 'agricultural politicians (nousei-haY pretend like they
 support farmers, but when necessary, they defect us by choosing to
 abide by the party order. We need someone?the true supporters of
 farmers?who will break away from the party to support farmers
 when they have to" (Tachibana 1984, 355).
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 examples suggest, indeed, that interest groups gather in
 formation about how serious politicians are committed
 by monitoring their levels of participation in the meetings
 and other activities in the Diet and in their constituen
 cies. The organizational structures of interest groups af
 fect their ability to gather and distribute information and
 monitor politicians' activities. Information and monitor
 ing of the politicians' district activities and responsive
 ness to the local interests may be more costly to acquire
 and coordinate for centralized interest groups without lo
 cal organizations than decentralized interest groups with
 both headquarters in Tokyo and local organizations in
 districts. This is due to the lack of transparency at the
 PARC meeting, as discussed previously, and local organi
 zations' geographic proximity to local representatives.9
 The second way to deal with the commitment failure
 is to effectively punish politicians who renege or shirk.10
 The organizational structures of interest groups affect
 their effectiveness to punish in two ways. First, decen
 tralized interest groups can punish individual politicians
 running in electoral systems with local districts (SNTV
 or SMD) by withdrawing political support without co
 ordinating their actions across districts. For instance, the
 anecdote of Akita prefecture demonstrates that while the
 national-level Agricultural Cooperative was a supporter
 of the LDP, the local-level offices had autonomy to make
 their own political decisions, e.g., endorsing a candi
 date from a different party. The local-level offices, not
 the national-level office, were the ones that were vote
 mobilizing organs during the election campaigns.11
 On the other hand, interest groups with centralized
 structure face several difficulties in monitoring and pun
 ishing politicians who did not deliver the promised policy
 benefits, particularly under a highly personalistic system
 like the SNTV system. Organized interests with a central
 ized structure, such as the Federation of Economic Or
 ganizations (Keidanren; big business's peak association),
 have used political donations as a means to reward or
 punish the political parties. They lack, however, the de
 centralized mechanism to punish individual politicians
 running from majoritarian districts who renege or shirk.
 For instance, after the major defections by some LDP
 politicians to oppose the 2005 postal reform legislation,
 Keidanren s president Okuda announced that "Overall,
 Keidanren supports the LDP, but how our member com
 pany deals with individual district cases is up to them."
 In other words, Keidanren can collectively act at the cen
 ter on whether to grant political donations to political
 parties, yet they could not coordinate their actions across
 local districts to mobilize or withdraw political support.
 It is thus likely that interest groups that have local
 organizations are more likely to lobby politicians because
 they are in a better position to monitor and punish a
 politician in his or her district.12 Centrally organized
 groups without local organizations are more likely to go
 to the national bureaucracy to influence different stages
 of policymaking such as drafting and implementation of
 policies that were passed.
 HI: Decentralized interest groups are more likely to lobby
 politicians than centralized interest groups without
 local organizations under the SNTV system before
 1994.
 The Electoral Reform: SMD/PR System
 The electoral reform of 1994 to the SMD/PR system
 changed the policymaking environment in two ways: (1)
 broadening and diversifying the scope of constituents
 whom legislators need to target and (2) centralizing pol
 icymaking power to party leaders (see Table 1). The new
 SMD/PR system allocates 300 seats for SMD and 180 seats
 for a closed-list PR system with 11 regional blocks. Voters
 cast two votes, one for a candidate from the SMD district
 and another for a party, and these votes are separate.
 First, under the SMD, a single representative must
 win and represent the whole district with a diverse con
 stituency (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004,10-12). This weak
 ens legislators' incentives to pursue the personal vote and
 instead strengthens their incentives to build a broader,
 majoritarian coalition with diffused and organized in
 terests. Second, since only one candidate from different
 parties competes for a seat, the reform strengthens leg
 islators' incentives to pursue party label. The SMD also
 9 For instance, Agricultural Cooperatives that have headquarters in
 Tokyo and local organizations in all of the 47 prefectures have bet
 ter ability to monitor and enforce contracts than an Association
 of Mega Banks which only has headquarters in Tokyo. The prox
 imity of local organizations to the Diet Member (favor giver) also
 allows him or her to monitor the interest groups' living up to their
 side of the bargain too, making commitments more credible and
 monitoring more effective. See Stokes (2005).
 10Politicians also have various ways to avoid the punishment, such
 as to shift blame to bureaucracy, opposition parties, foreign coun
 tries {"gaiatsu"; see Schoppa 1997), or intraparty conflicts.
 11 Indeed, Tachibana (1984) suggests that the Agricultural Cooper
 ative is decentralized fiscally and politically despite its formal rule
 that "all the members have to abide by the headquarters (chuou
 kai) orders" (355).
 12 Another reason for why interest groups with local organizations
 are more likely to lobby politicians is that the proximity makes it
 easier to access politicians. The "access" argument remains insuffi
 cient, however, because the majority of lower-house representatives
 spend half of their time in Tokyo and the other half in their own
 districts, and the majority of organized interests surveyed have
 headquarters or local branches in Tokyo.
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 Table 1 Policymaking Environment and Lobbying Strategies
 Narrow
 Scope of Legislators' Target
 Broad
 Policymaking Structure
 (Contract Enforcement)
 Decentralized
 SNTV
 (Pre-reform)
 "Decentralized Lobbying'
 SMD
 (post-1994)
 "Continuing decentralized
 lobbying, but weaker due to
 the broader coalition"
 Centralized
 Closed-List PR
 (post-1994)
 "Centralized Lobbying"
 SMD
 (post-1994)
 "Centralized Lobbying
 due to the party-centered
 nomination process"
 centralizes the power structure within parties because
 legislators depend on party nominations to win seats
 (Asano 2006). Third, under the closed-list PR, the parties
 choose the candidates and their ranking on the list. Thus,
 parties have greater control over their individual legisla
 tors than when they were under SNTV (Shugart 2001).
 Voters also must cast a vote for a party under a PR system,
 which weakens the tie between individual legislators and
 electorates.
 Legislative organizations adapt to legislators' new
 incentives shaped by the electoral reform (Pekkanen,
 Nyblade, and Krauss 2006). After the electoral reform
 bill was passed, the LDP stopped limiting its representa
 tives' PARC affiliations to a maximum of four committees
 and allowed anyone to join as many committees as he or
 she wished. The LDP recognized that its representatives
 need to be more policy generalists to win single-member
 districts (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004, 17-20). The poli
 cymaking power has also shifted from individual politi
 cians to party leaders and the cabinet ("centralization";
 Muramatsu and Kume 2006). Table 1 summarizes our ex
 pectations of how the policymaking environment shapes
 lobbying strategies before and after the electoral reform.
 Interest groups should adapt their lobbying strate
 gies to legislators' new incentives. First, the centralization
 of policymaking means that the effectiveness of the de
 centralized monitoring and punishment mechanism (i.e.,
 withdrawing votes or candidate endorsement in a district)
 should decrease under the SMD/PR system. The decen
 tralized punishment is less effective for the regional block
 PR portion as it encompasses more diverse sectors and
 geography than the previous SNTV districts. The SMD
 portion also forces representatives to build broader ma
 joritarian coalitions in constituencies than under SNTV
 (McGillivray 1997, 2004; Rogowski and Kayser 2002).13
 This means that decentralized interest groups will con
 tinue to lobby SMD representatives via local organi
 zations, although this incentive might be weaker than
 under SNTV as they face more difficulty monitoring and
 enforcing a contract with legislators in districts. Instead,
 decentralized groups will also begin lobbying legislators
 through the central channel (i.e., headquarters) to influ
 ence the party decisions. On the other hand, we would
 expect that the centralized interest groups lobby politi
 cians more than the previous two surveys. This is because
 they can use the centralized punishment mechanisms, i.e.,
 using PR votes to political parties under the new electoral
 system. Thus Japan's mixed electoral system provides in
 centives for interest groups to centralize their lobbying
 strategies. These expected changes lead us to hypothesize:
 H2: Centralized interest groups will be more likely to
 lobby politicians after the reform than in the pre
 vious SNTV period. Decentralized groups will be
 more likely to centralize their lobbying strategies
 13McGillivray (1997, 2004) also demonstrates that in majoritarian
 systems, legislators are more likely to target core supporters un
 der a weak party discipline, while they are more likely to target
 swing voters under a strong party discipline. While this theory
 offers predictions regarding legislators' targeting incentives (the
 vertical axis of our 2x2 shown in Table 1), we could derive consis
 tent predictions on our enforceability of contracts from it. While
 targeting swing voters can mean lower enforceability with individ
 ual legislators, strong party discipline means party functions as a
 reliable enforcer of the contract?thus, centralization of lobbying
 strategies.
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 Table 2 The Effectiveness of Decentralized versus Centralized Punishment Mechanism
 Organizational Structures  Instruments
 Survey 1
 1980
 SNTV
 Survey 2
 1994(1993)
 SNTV
 Survey 3
 2003
 SMD/PR
 Local Org
 (Decentralized)
 No Local Org
 (Centralized)
 Decentralized
 -voting
 -candidate endorsement
 -political funds
 Centralized
 -party votes
 -political funds
 +
 difficult due to
 coordination
 +
 difficult due to
 coordination
 Weaker effects
 +
 Note: + refers to effectiveness of instruments.
 by shifting allocation of lobbying efforts from local
 organizations to the central office than in the previ
 ous period.
 Corollary 2-1: Thus differences between centralized and
 decentralized interest groups will be reduced after
 electoral reform compared to the previous SNTV
 period.
 Another major institutional reform that may increase
 the effectiveness of the centralized punishment mecha
 nism (i.e., withdrawing campaign contribution or party
 votes) is the 1994 campaign finance reforms?passed
 along with the electoral reform?that restricts the con
 tributions of organizations to individual politicians. The
 revision of the Regulation on Political Funds (Seiji Shikin
 Hou Kisei), which was phased in during 2000, limits or
 ganized interests' political donations in two ways. First,
 organized interests or a firm can contribute the maxi
 mum of 50 million Yen per one political party and a total
 of 100 million Yen per year. Second, the revision also
 limits the channels in which organized interests can con
 tribute political donations. Direct donations to individual
 politicians are prohibited after the revision (Ministry of
 Internal Affairs and Communication 2009) as are dona
 tions to party factions that used to distribute funds to
 the individual politician. Much of the campaign fund
 ing now is routed through the political party. Therefore,
 campaign finance reform should reinforce the effect of
 electoral reform on lobbying: for the centralized interest
 group, their ability to punish politicians via the campaign
 contribution route should increase after the reform; on
 the other hand, decentralized groups' ability to punish in
 dividual politicians may diminish, and they might chan
 nel campaign contribution via the central office after the
 reform.14
 H3: A ter campaign finance reforms, centralized groups
 will be more likely to lobby politicians than they were
 before the reform.
 The above hypotheses are summarized in Table 2.
 Data and Method
 The three interest group surveys conducted by the
 Muramatsu-Kume group in 1980,1994, and 2003 provide
 data on 200-300 interest group organizations for each
 survey that ranges from peak associations of various in
 dustries to nongovernmental organizations and religious
 groups. The surveys were conducted by a professional sur
 vey research firm in Japan on a sample of interest group
 leaders. The sampling procedure is described in detail in
 the appendix. We use each interest group organization
 as a unit of analysis and analyze their choice of lobbying
 venues and intensity for each of the three surveys.15 The
 models estimated have the following structure:
 Lobbying Politicians i
 = ? ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES i
 + ?2 RESOURCES i
 + ?3 ISSUES/SECTORS i + e
 Our first data point (1980) is the height of the LDP
 dominance. Our second data point ( 1994) is right after the
 LDP lost power briefly, but since the survey asks interest
 groups about the time period prior to electoral reform, it
 is about the early 1990s period when the LDP had been
 14Taniguchi (1999) argues that due to loopholes in this law, in
 terest groups can contribute unlimited donations to local party
 branches, which are essentially run by individual legislators. We
 lack the data to test whether organized interests' political dona
 tions to local branches increased or decreased due to the campaign
 finance reform.
 15 See fn 22 for detailed discussion of why we did not pool data
 across three surveys.
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 in power for almost 45 years. Our third data point is
 2003 when the LDP had been back in power about eight
 years and after electoral reform with two elections under
 the new mixed electoral system. These data provide a
 detailed picture of the interest groups' lobbying activities
 in which 339 of 734 are the same interest groups over a
 quarter of a century. To capture both the venue choice and
 intensity of the lobbying activities, we use two different
 operationalizations of "venue selection" as our dependent
 variable.
 The Dependent Variable: Relative versus
 Absolute Choice of Venues
 While existing studies tend to theorize multiple venues
 are mutually exclusive, i.e., interest groups choose one
 venue or the other, in reality, the choice of venue is rather
 relative. The majority of interest groups lobby both politi
 cians and bureaucracy but strategically allocate their lob
 bying resources?such as time and human capital?to
 these venues to maximize their chances of achieving pol
 icy goals. In order to capture the interest groups' decision,
 we create an index of relative allocation of interest groups'
 resources for lobbying politicians versus bureaucrats. We
 do so by using the following question:
 When your group approaches an administration,
 how often do you contact people in the following
 positions?
 Respondents choose their level of frequency of contact on
 a 5-point scale (1: Very Frequent; 2: Frequent; 3: Not so
 often; 4: Rare; and 5: Not at all) for each of the following
 10 positions: (1) Prime Minister, (2) Chief Cabinet Secre
 tary, (3) Minister, (4) Deputy Minister, (5) Parliamentary
 Vice-Minister, (6) Permanent Vice-Minister, (7) Director,
 (8) Section Manager, (9) Assistant Section Manager, and
 (10) Chief Clerk.16
 We categorize these 10 positions into two groups, one
 with positions held by politicians ( 1 to 5) and by bureau
 crats (6 to 10).17 We transform this five-scale response
 so that the higher the value, the more frequent an inter
 est group contacts a given position (4. Very Frequent, 3.
 Frequent, 2. Not so often, 1. Rare, 0. Not at all). We ag
 gregate these data on the frequency of contacts by interest
 groups with politicians (variable named "Pol Contact")
 and bureaucrats ( "Bu Contact") and calculate the total
 frequency of contacts for each interest group per survey.
 Then we calculate the percentage of the total contacts with
 politicians ("%Pol Contact"). The percentage variable is
 only calculated for the second (1994) and the third sur
 veys (2003) because the first survey (1980) only includes
 two political positions (Prime Minister and Ministers) in
 the questionnaire and thus lacks comparability. Second,
 we separately analyze the level of lobbying activities (as
 opposed to the relative allocation) to politicians and bu
 reaucrats using the same covariates to see whether there is
 a systematic difference in characteristics of interest groups
 that lobby politicians and that lobby bureaucracy.
 Our main independent variable is whether an inter
 est group has local organizations that could potentially
 make independent decisions about candidate endorse
 ment, vote switching, or campaign contribution to leg
 islators. We proxy the centralized versus decentralized
 organizational structure with interest groups' response to
 a questionnaire on whether the interest group has local
 organizations or not (variable named "Local Org"). While
 the majority of interest groups that have local organiza
 tions in these surveys have headquarters in Tokyo, we
 differentiate groups that have headquarters in Tokyo and
 groups that have headquarters outside of the Tokyo vicin
 ity to parse out Walker's (1991) access argument from our
 organizational structure argument. "No Tokyo HQ" takes
 a value of one if a group has headquarters outside of the
 Tokyo vicinity and zero otherwise.18
 Alternative Hypotheses and Controls
 Organizational Resources. The first alternative hypoth
 esis we test is that the interest groups' organizational
 resource might better account for lobbying patterns
 16A potential issue with using this questionnaire is that it limits
 the universe of "bureaucrats and politicians" to those who hold
 important positions in a government. The benefit of using this
 question, on the other hand, is that it captures groups' contacts
 with politicians and bureaucrats that actually matter for policy
 making and implementation. Moreover, Deputy Minister and Par
 liamentary Vice Ministerial positions are usually given to junior to
 mid-career politicians (mean numbers of terms served are three).
 Another advantage of using this questionnaire is its specificity re
 garding which government positions interest groups contact. While
 a questionnaire such as "how often do you contact politicians (or
 bureaucrats)" (this question does not exist in this survey) may seem
 better because it captures interest groups' contact with a broader
 spectrum of politicians and bureaucrats, defining who constitutes
 politicians or bureaucrats is often ambiguous and may suffer from
 the lack of comparability across interest groups' responses.
 17There have been three ministerial positions during the three sur
 vey periods that were held by nonelected members: Saburo Ohki
 (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1980), Ryoko Akamatsu (Minister of
 Education, 1994), and Heizo Takenaka (Minister of Finance Related
 Matters, 2003). We tried to test the effect of having nonelected min
 isters on an interest group's lobbying strategy, but we were unable
 to test it due to the lack of panel data on interest groups that fall
 under jurisdictions of these three ministries.
 18 These No Tokyo HQ organizations tend to be religious or civil
 society groups.
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 (de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo 2002; Oison 1965). In
 particular, groups that provide organized votes or cam
 paign contribution might prefer to go through a political
 route while weaker interests might prefer to go through
 an administrative route. We include three variables. The
 larger the size of membership (logged "Injmembership"),
 the more likely that an interest group lobbies politi
 cians.19 We also expect that the number of special interest
 politicians who represent a given sectoral interest ( "Pol
 icy Tribes") should have positive effects on the interest
 group's decision to lobby politicians. The data on special
 interest politicians is matched with eight different types
 of sectoral interests, such as agriculture, welfare, industry
 and economy, defense, and labor.20 Alternatively, groups
 may either send current members to parliament or ap
 point legislators on their executive board to enhance their
 connections with politicians. "Current MPs" takes a value
 of one when a group's member is a member of parliament
 and zero otherwise.
 We also include two variables that measure the
 strength of interest groups' connections with bureau
 crats. "Advisory Council (Shingikai)" takes a value of one
 when a group has a membership at advisory councils
 at ministries where potential legislations are discussed
 with bureaucrats and experts. "Retirementposition" takes
 a value of one when a group offers a retirement position
 for government officials {Amakudari), and zero other
 wise. Finally, a long time-horizon and repeated interac
 tion among actors make monitoring and enforcement
 of contracts with politicians easier (Axelrod 1984; Grief,
 Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994; Snyder 1992).Thus, the age
 of the interest group as of the survey date is calculated by
 the year of the survey minus the year of the organization's
 establishment {"Group Age").
 Issue Areas and Sectors. The second alternative hypothe
 sis is that the sectoral or issue characteristics affect interest
 groups' lobbying strategies (Alt et al. 1999; Hiscox 2002;
 Magee, Brock, and Young 1978). We include a dummy
 variable for interest groups in agriculture ( "Agriculture"),
 industry {"Industry"), and labor {"Labor") to control for
 the sectoral and issue effects. Sectoral dummies also allow
 us to identify any agency slack that exists between a partic
 ular Ministry and legislators (McCubbins and Schwartz
 1984). We expect that agricultural interests will consis
 tently select politicians more than bureaucrats to lobby.
 Conversely, industry organizations with its diversity and
 dispersion across different electoral districts will choose to
 lobby bureaucrats more, as will labor since it has few close
 connections to the conservative LDP.21 We also include a
 dummy variable ("SM-sized Industry') for organizations
 dominated by small and medium-sized firms as small to
 medium-sized firms are more likely to be geographically
 concentrated in districts, and they have been a strong
 supporter of the LDP.
 The sectoral analysis is insufficient when
 globalization?freer movement of goods, capital,
 and labor?generates economic winners and losers
 19We dealt with missing values for the membership variable as
 follows. If a given group's membership information is available for
 the second or third waves of the survey, we use its response to
 a questionnaire on its membership during the past 20 years in a
 10-year interval.
 20Special interest politicians (policy tribes or "zoku") were defined
 and operationalized as those veteran politicians who have served in
 key executive positions such as the party's Policy Affairs Research
 Council (PARC), Diet Committees, and subcabinet and cabinet
 positions over time in a particular issue area. We follow the coding
 of Sat? and Matsuzaki (1987) and Inoguchi and Iwai (1987).
 21 Surprisingly, labor groups' contact scores with politicians
 holding important positions in the government do not differ
 systematically from non-labor groups or even from agricultural
 groups which have been known to have close connections with
 the LDP (see table below). However, if we use another set of
 questionnaires, which asks groups' frequency of contacts with each
 of the major political parties, labor groups do lobby opposition
 party politicians more than other groups, especially the DPJ and
 SDP politicians (see figure below). Those who study Japanese
 labor politics have shown that labor achieved their desired policy
 outcomes (e.g., higher wages and unemployment insurance)
 through within-enterprise labor unions, not through nationally
 organized labor unions or the opposition parties (Kume 1998).
 1980  1994  2003
 Labor
 Non_Labor
 Agriculture
 L5?
 1.47
 1.48
 1.26
 1.40
 1.33
 1.26  1.24
 Note: An ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3.
 Labor versus Agricultural Groups: Party-Level Contact
 Scores for the Third Survey (0: Not at all to 4: Very often)
 3.2
 2.5
 2.0
 1.4
 0.7
 0.9
 Agriculture
 Labor
 LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
 DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan (the largest opposition party)
 SDP: Social Democratic Party
 JCP: Japan Communist Party
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 Table 3 Descriptive Statistics
 Variable
 Pol Contact (survey 1)
 Pol Contact (survey 2)
 Pol Contact (survey 3)
 Bu Contact (survey 1)
 Bu Contact (survey 2)
 Bu Contact (survey 3)
 % Pol Contact
 Local Org
 No Tokyo HQ
 ln_membership
 Current MPs
 Policy Tribes
 Advisory Council
 Retirement
 Subsidy
 Group Age
 Regulation
 Agriculture
 Labor
 SM-sized Industry
 International
 Obs Mean
 252 1.357143
 247 1.283401
 235 1.344681
 252 1.563492
 247 1.566802
 235 1.625532
 692 -3.31192
 724 .7348066
 734 .020436
 516 10.40358
 713 .2328191
 734 16.30654
 729 .6406036
 727 .2572215
 721 .221914
 725 35.56828
 706 1.338527
 734 .113079
 734 .1566757
 252 .1944444
 470 .106383
 MEGUMI A AND ELLIS KRAUSS
 Std. Dev. Min Max
 1.06344 0 3
 1.119237 0 3
 1.152998 0 3
 1.013817 0 3
 1.071902 0 3
 1.072275 0 3
 4.72913 -11.51292 11.51292
 .4417413 0 1
 .1415827 0 1
 2.983749 3.135494 16.86194
 .4229246 0 1
 24.08568 0 83
 .480153 0 1
 .4374034 0 1
 .4158221 0 1
 18.62074 2 125
 1.282778 0 3
 .3169053 0 1
 .3637427 0 1
 .39656 0 1
 .3086557 0 1
 within a sector (Milner 1988). We expect that those who
 stand to benefit from globalization are more likely to go
 to bureaucrats as they tend to have the upper hand in
 negotiating with foreign countries (Davis 2003, 2004),
 while those who stand to lose are more likely to go to
 politicians for compensation and protection. To test
 this, a variable "International" is included which takes a
 value of one when a group has a foreign office and zero
 otherwise.
 We also control for the nature of contacts between in
 terest groups and bureaucrats/politicians. "Subsidy" takes
 a value of one and zero otherwise when interest groups
 receive subsidy from the government. In order to test
 whether heavily regulated groups are more likely to go to
 bureaucrats, we create an index of regulation ( "Regulation
 index") by aggregating the interest group's zero (No) and
 one ( Yes) response to the following three questions: "Do
 you receive a license or permission from a government?",
 "Are you a subject of legal regulations by a government?",
 and "Do you receive administrative guidance from a gov
 ernment?" A detailed description of these variables is in
 Table 3.
 The electoral reform of 1994 is an intervening variable
 that affects the relationship between the characteristics of
 interest groups and their lobbying strategies. We analyze
 each survey separately and infer the effects of the elec
 toral reform by deducing expected changes in the types
 of interest groups that go to politicians or bureaucrats
 between the 1994 and the 2003 surveys.22
 Estimations
 Our first dependent variable is an aggregation of six to 10
 "contact scores" with politicians and bureaucrats. Since
 a response category for each of the questionnaires ranges
 from zero ("not at all") to four ("very often"), the total
 contact score is an ordered, categorical dependent vari
 able that can theoretically range from zero to 40 (four
 22Alternatively, we pooled the data across the three surveys and
 include interaction terms between each of the three survey-year
 dummy variables (0-1) and our main independent variable Lo
 cal Org (0-1). The results confirm our theory. Despite the pooled
 model's confirmation of our theory, however, we present separate
 models for each of the three surveys for the following three rea
 sons: ( 1 ) par met r heteroge eity issue (see Heinline 2008; Western
 1998), (2) difficulty interpreting the substantive effects of interac
 tion terms in ordered logit models (see Ai and Norton 2003, 129),
 (3) a better way to present our results leveraging 144 groups that
 were consistently surveyed in the second and third surveys (see
 Figure 1).
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 multiplied by ten). We categorize the data into four lev
 els of contact (0: not at all; 1: sometimes; 2: frequent;
 and 3: very frequent) and analyze the data with an or
 dered logit estimation. Our second dependent variable
 is the allocation of lobbying efforts to politicians relative
 to bureaucrats as described previously. This is a contin
 uous percentage variable ranging from zero to one and
 is transformed as follows LnX ? ln(Y/(l ? Y)) to allow
 OLS estimation ("perc-poLcontact")P
 Results
 Tables 4 to 7 show coefficients estimates of variables on
 the choice of lobbying strategies. The results lend strong
 support to our organizational structure argument even
 after controlling for organizational resources, issue areas,
 and the nature of contacts. We discuss specific results
 below.
 Organizational Structures: Centralized
 versus Decentralized Groups
 Table 4 shows the results on the frequency of contacts with
 politicians. The effects of organizational structures of in
 terest groups are significant for their decisions to lobby
 politicians under the SNTV system. Under the SNTV sys
 tem, decentralized interest groups are more likely to go
 to a political route when they lobby than centralized in
 terests, confirming Hypothesis 1. The results are robust
 with relative operationalization of "lobbying politicians"
 as presented in Table 5.
 The substantive impact of the effects of the orga
 nizational structures on lobbying is quite large. Table 6
 presents the simulated effects of groups having local orga
 nizations on their frequency of lobbying with legislators.
 During the second survey (1994), the predicted probabil
 ity of centralized interest groups not contacting legislators
 at all (Y = 0) is 33% higher than decentralized inter
 est groups. On the other hand, the predicted probabil
 ity of decentralized interest groups contacting politicians
 "sometimes" is 40% compared to centralized groups'
 18%. The probability of contacting politicians "fre
 quently" is 12% for decentralized groups and 3% for cen
 tralized groups. In Table 5, a one-unit shift from no local
 organization to having local organizations increases the
 relative allocation of lobbying efforts to politicians around
 44 percentage points (e.g., 6-50%) in the second survey.
 Table 4 Ordered Logit Estimates of the
 Frequency of Lobbying with
 Legislators (Controlling for
 Bureaucratic Contact)
 1980  1994  2003
 Organizational Structures
 Local Org 0.926
 (2.02)*:
 No Tokyo HQ
 ("Access")
 Organizational Resources
 ln_membership
 Current MPs
 Policy Tribes
 Advisory Council
 Retirement
 Group Age
 Sectors and Issues
 Subsidy
 Regulation
 Agriculture
 Labor
 Bu Contact
 SM-sized Industry
 International
 cut_l
 cut_2
 cut_3
 Obs
 0.031
 (0.56)
 0.688
 (1.95)*
 0.669
 (2.06)**
 0.313
 (0.64)
 0.021
 (1.48)
 -0.521
 (1.35)
 -0.102
 (0.83)
 -0.545
 (0.97)
 -0.490
 (1.23)
 0.334
 (6.05)***
 0.121
 (0.30)
 4.020
 (0.855)
 5.676
 (0.905)
 7.482
 (0.967)
 184
 1.635
 (3.72)***
 -31.793
 (0.00)
 0.167
 (2.63)***
 0.342
 (0.91)
 -0.004
 (0.60)
 0.467
 (1.31)
 0.197
 (0.47)
 0.050
 (4.49)***
 -0.044
 (0.11)
 -0.393
 (2.44)**
 -1.346
 (2.23)**
 -0.383
 (0.82)
 0.268
 (6.48)***
 1.077
 (1.40)
 6.009
 (1.044)
 8.064
 (1.141)
 9.758
 (1.208)
 173
 0.684
 (1.57)
 3.454
 (3.28)**
 -0.109
 (1.57)
 -0.403
 (0.90)
 0.008
 (0.79)
 0.334
 (0.82)
 -0.424
 (0.93)
 0.016
 (1.52)
 0.006
 (0.01)
 -0.488
 (2.94)**
 0.109
 (0.22)
 -0.593
 (0.68)
 0.378
 (6.93)**
 0.503
 (0.82)
 2.676
 (0.925)
 4.219
 (0.976)
 5.644
 (1.028)
 134
 Absolute value of statistics in parentheses.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
 1%. No Tokyo HQ is dropped from the model (1) due to
 collinearity. 23 We thank Langche Zeng for suggesting this.
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 Table 5 Simulated Effects of Groups Having
 Local Organizations on the
 Frequency of Lobbying with
 Legislators (1994 Survey)
 No Local First
 Local Org ( 1 ) Org (0) Difference
 0.448 0.780 -0.333
 (0.144) (0.118) (0.093)
 0.397 0.180 0.217
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.074)
 0.120 0.031 0.089
 (0.06) (0.024) (0.044)
 0.035 0.008 0.027
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.019)
 Note: The ordered logit estimates are from Table 4. The predicted
 probabilities are simulated using CLARIFY software available at
 http://gking.harvard.edu/clariiy. Standard errors in parentheses.
 The Effect of Electoral Reform
 After the electoral reform (2003), the overall intensity of
 lobbying with politicians has increased. Among the 144
 groups that were consistently surveyed for the second and
 the third survey, the average contact scores have increased
 three points on a 16-point scale (3.7 to 6.9). This is con
 sistent with our contractual approach that interest groups
 are more likely to lobby politicians when enforceability
 of contract is high under the centralized policymaking
 system.
 We find no systematic evidence that decentralized in
 terest groups are more likely to lobby politicians than cen
 tralized interests. This is consistent with our Hypothesis
 2 that under the mixed SMD/PR system, the effectiveness
 of the decentralized punishment mechanism via voting
 or endorsing a candidate in SM districts declines, and
 the effectiveness of the centralized punishment via cam
 paign contribution or mobilizing/withdrawing PR party
 votes increases. Indeed, the effects of decentralized ver
 sus centralized structure diminish after the electoral re
 form. Figure 1 presents the frequency of contacts with
 politicians before and after the reform for the 144 groups
 that were consistently surveyed for the second and third
 survey. Centralized groups have increased their contact
 scores substantially by 63%, while decentralized groups
 moderately increased their contact scores by 18%, which
 confirms H2 and H3.
 Not at All (0)
 Sometimes (1)
 Frequent (2)
 Very Frequent (3)
 Who Contacts Bureaucrats?
 Table 7 presents results on the frequency of inter
 est groups' contacts with bureaucrats using the same
 Table 6 Ordered Logit Estimates of the
 Frequency of Lobbying with
 Bureaucrats
 1980 1994 2003
 Organizational Structures
 Local Org 0.548 0.125 -0.487
 (1.32) (0.33) (1.14)
 No Tokyo HQ -37.663 -37.111
 (0.00) (0.00)
 Organizational Resources
 ln_membership 0.053 0.034 0.170
 (1.00) (0.59) (2.63)***
 Current MP -0.358 -0.124 0.244
 (1.07) (0.34) (0.57)
 Policy Tribes -0.013 -0.020 -0.001
 (0.59) (3.46)*** (0.07)
 Advisory Council 0.679 1.509 0.734
 (2.18)** (4.46)*** (2.00)**
 Retirement -0.623 -0.052 0.873
 (1.26) (0.14) (2.02)**
 Group Age 0.043 0.007 0.013
 (3.10)*** (0.76) (1.28)
 Sectors and Issues
 Subsidy 0.697 -0.059 0.773
 (1.84)* (0.16) (1.59)
 Regulation 0.347 0.260 0.222
 (2.84)*** (1.86)* (1.44)
 Agriculture 0.890 -0.641 -0.302
 (1.49) (1.13) (0.64)
 Labor 0.543 -0.804 -0.770
 (1.30) (1.79)* (0.92)
 SM-sized Industry -0.686
 (1.36)
 International -0.344 0.259
 (0.50) (0.46)
 cut_l 0.937 -0.811 1.108
 (0.746) (-.767) (0.827)
 cut_2 2.634 0.932 2.368
 (0.761) (0.763) (0.842)
 cut_3 4.662 2.366 4.032
 (0.809) (0.781) (0.894)
 Observations 184 173 134
 Absolute value of statistics in parentheses.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 No Tokyo HQ is dropped from the model (1) due to collinearity.
 covariates as our analysis on contacts with politicians.
 Overall, the organizational structures of interest groups
 have systematic effects on their relative decisions to
 lobby bureaucrats over politicians, but they do not have
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 Table 7 Relative Allocation of Lobbying
 Efforts to Legislators (%)
 1994 2003
 Organizational Structures
 Local Org 2.995 1.471
 (3.07)*** (1.19)
 No Tokyo HQ 0.000 9.292
 (0.00) (3.15)***
 Organizational Resources
 ln_membership 0.328 0.145
 (2.39)** (0.80)
 Policy Tribes -0.021 -0.015
 (1.55) (0.55)
 Current MPs -0.018 -2.007
 (0.02) (1.61)
 Advisory Council 1.267 ?0.265
 (1.61) (0.24)
 Retirement 1.381 1.537
 (1.53) (1.20)
 Group Age 0.058 0.058
 (2.61)*** (1.96)*
 Sectors and Issues
 Subsidy -0.395 0.431
 (0.43) (0.32)
 Regulation -0.259 -0.603
 (0.76) (1.38)
 Agriculture -3.754 0.884
 (2.78)*** (0.62)
 Labor -1.117 -2.741
 (1.07) (1.20)
 International 2.015 -0.474
 (1.22) (0.30)
 Constant -11.309 -7.228
 (6.10)*** (3.13)***
 Observations 163 124
 R-squared 0.22 0.15
 Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 Ln_Y = Ln (Y/(l - Y)) when 0 < Y < 1. Ln_Y = Ln(0.00001/(1 -
 0.00001)) when Y = 0; Ln_Y = Ln(0.99999/(1 - 0.99999)) when
 Y= 1.
 systematic effects on their intensity of lobbying with bu
 reaucrats. This is consistent with our expectation that the
 organizational structures of interest groups should matter
 mostly to their decisions to lobby politicians because they
 provide interest groups with monitoring and punishment
 mechanisms when the commitment fails. There is no
 equivalent punishment mechanism interest groups can
 use for bureaucrats such as withdrawing campaign con
 tribution or votes. 24 One exception, however, is the age
 of the group. During the first survey, the older organi
 zations were more likely to go to a bureaucrat, which is
 consistent with Muramatsu' s argument that older orga
 nizations have more institutionalized relationships with
 bureaucracy (Muramatsu et al. 1986, 73; Muramatsu and
 Krauss 1987, 522). The effect of Group Age, however, di
 minishes after 1980.
 The Advisory Council membership and degrees to
 which a given organization is regulated ( "regulation in
 dex") have significant positive effects on their decisions
 to lobby bureaucrats, as expected. Whether an organized
 interest offers a retirement position (Amakudari) for bu
 reaucrats has no systematic effects for the first two sur
 veys, but has positive effects on groups' decision to lobby
 bureaucrats during the 2003 the survey. This is due to
 the fact that fewer numbers of retirement positions be
 came available under Prime Minister Koizumi's reform,
 and this has increased the value of the reward for bureau
 crats. These results are particularly interesting in regard
 to the conventional wisdom on the retirement positions
 (amakudari) that sees it as a means by which interest
 groups hold agencies hostage to favorable treatment in
 regulation (Amyx 2004; Schaede 1994). Our findings in
 dicate that its impact on lobbying decisions of interest
 groups may be less than originally thought when such
 positions were abundant in the 1980s and 1990s.
 Other Findings: Organizational Resources
 A few alternative hypotheses find expected support. Orga
 nized interests that have more political resources?such
 as the larger membership size and having a member of
 parliament as their member?are more likely to work
 through a political route than a bureaucratic route. The
 longer a given group has been around, the more likely
 that they contact politicians, confirming the importance
 of the long time-horizon in increasing the enforceability
 of contract.
 The number of policy tribe politicians has no sys
 tematic effects on groups' decisions to lobby politicians
 and has weak, negative effects on their decisions to
 lobby bureaucrats for the second survey, which is unex
 pected. A possible explanation for this is that policy tribe
 politicians were not institutionalized during the 1980
 24 One possible punishment for bureaucrats is not to grant a retire
 ment position ( "Amakudari") for retirees from a particular bureau.
 A then-midlevel bureaucrat in an economic ministry said he had
 to be very careful not to alienate any of the key interest groups in
 an electronic industry for fear of damaging his chances for a good
 retirement position, which was years ahead. The author asked, "Are
 you really worried about that now?" and the reply was, "We all are"
 (Interview conducted by one of the authors).
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 Figure 1 Pre- vs. Post-Reform Changes in Mean Contact Scores
 with Legislators
 (144 Groups that were consistently surveyed in 1994 and 2003)
 2.29
 3.72
 4.26
 5.03
 1994
 2003
 Centralized  Decentralized
 survey; they then developed into mediators who align
 organized interests with bureaucratic, sectoral interests
 by the 1994 survey, but had lost their mission after the
 electoral reform due to the centralization of power to the
 Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Krauss 2007; Muramatsu
 2005a,2005b,2005c).25 In sum, organizational resources
 do affect interest groups' decision to lobby politicians, but
 the effect is weak and inconsistent across the surveys.
 Control Variables
 A majority of control variables turn out to have no system
 atic effects. For instance, the nature of contacts with policy
 makers?i.e., whether an interest group receives subsidy
 or does not?has systematic effects on the groups' choice
 to lobby politicians. Degrees to which the state intervenes
 with interest group activity via regulation do have sys
 tematic, negative effects on their decision to lobby politi
 cians, which is expected. Control variables for sectors
 also show interesting results. Agricultural organizations
 are less likely to contact politicians, particularly for the
 1994 survey, and these results tend to hold even when
 we analyze the proportion of total contacts devoted to
 politicians relative to bureaucracy. The possible explana
 tion for this might be that agricultural liberalization was
 negotiated at the Uruguay Round in the early 1990s. A
 series of trade talks at the multilateral negotiations may
 have given the upper hand to bureaucracy over politicians
 (Davis 2003, 2004).
 In sum, this article has identified the effect of ma
 jor electoral reform in 1994 on the choice of lobbying
 activities. The new electoral system decreased the ef
 fectiveness of the decentralized punishment mechanism
 while it increased the effectiveness of mobilizing versus
 withdrawing party votes for the centralized groups. The
 other decentralized punishment mechanism, i.e., with
 drawing campaign contributions for individual politi
 cians, has become less effective due to the revision of
 Regulation on Political Funds in 1994. These institutional
 reforms changed the effectiveness of various monitoring
 and punishment mechanisms interest groups can use and
 consequently their lobbying behavior.
 Conclusion
 The findings presented in this article suggest a re
 consideration of the preference and resource-centered
 25To lend support to this interpretation, whether the organization
 has policy tribe politicians or has a local organization are substi
 tutive (i.e., negative correlation coefficients at ?0.17) before the
 electoral reform. Organized interests lobbied either through a local
 organization or policy tribe politicians, but not both. This relation
 ship has changed after the reform?these two variables positively
 correlate at 0.08.
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 explanations of lobbying widely used in the literature.
 We have demonstrated the importance of theorizing lob
 bying venue choice and intensity as a function of con
 tract enforceability between interest groups and pol
 icy makers. The organizational characteristics of interest
 groups?i.e., whether an interest group is decentralized
 or centralized?substantially affect their choice to lobby
 politicians or bureaucrats because they are associated with
 varying abilities to monitor and enforce the contracts and
 punish when they fail to deliver on promises.
 Our contractual approach solves some of the ma
 jor puzzles left in the literature on lobbying. Organized
 interests tend to lobby legislators who are sympathetic
 to their policies and who have a long-term relationship,
 because with repeated interactions and with a long time
 horizon, it is easier to enforce contracts with them. The
 low contract enforceability characterized by a decentral
 ized policymaking environment?such as the one un
 der the SNTV electoral system?deters intensive lobby
 ing with politicians by organized interests, particularly
 by groups characterized by centralized structures. These
 groups lobby bureaucrats more extensively because their
 organizational structures do not allow them to enforce
 contracts with legislators or punish them when they fail.
 On the other hand, in a more party-centered, centralized
 policymaking environment with high contract enforce
 ability, interest groups lobby politicians more intensively
 than under SNTV. In particular, we have demonstrated
 that centralized groups have increased their contacts more
 significantly than decentralized groups.
 Our findings echo an emerging literature on political
 market failure and how economic and political organi
 zations develop to deal with such risk. While that litera
 ture focuses on the repeated play and reputation (Snyder
 1992), the role of community network (Stokes 2005), and
 the role of the media (Finan 2008) in making politicians
 accountable to constituents, this article has proposed one
 of the understudied aspects that affects organized inter
 ests' ability to enforce the contract with policy makers: or
 ganizational structures. Our results suggest that electoral
 systems and organizational structures of interest groups
 can be a mirror image: electoral systems that foster rep
 resentation of local interests are more likely to encourage
 decentralization of organized interests, while those that
 foster representation of broader constituents are more
 likely to encourage centralization of groups. Our findings
 reinforce the long-held view that interest group organi
 zation is shaped by the structure of political institutions
 (e.g., Golden 1986; Gourevitch and Shinn 2006; Iverson,
 Cusack, and Soskice 2007). We have gone further to show
 that interest groups' lobbying strategies are shaped by
 electoral systems.
 Second, our findings also force us to reconsider a
 conventional wisdom in the literature on how different
 electoral systems represent diffused versus organized in
 terests. While a majoritarian system such as SMD is be
 lieved to represent diffused interests better than semipro
 portional (SNTV) or proportional representation systems
 (Bawn and Thies 2003; Rogowski and Kayser 2002), we
 demonstrate that the centralization of policymaking and
 candidate nomination process under a mixed electoral
 system means high contract enforceability between politi
 cians and organized interest. This high enforceability, in
 turn, intensifies organized interests' lobbying activities
 with legislators. In particular, centralized interest groups
 without local organizations might gain a larger voice
 under such centralized policymaking environment and
 could overshadow the voice of diffused interests, such as
 consumers and citizens. Our contractual approach sheds
 a new light on this debate by showing that electoral sys
 tems do not simply shape the scope of interests legislators
 need to target (i.e., narrow vs. broad?horizontal axis in
 Table 1), but they also shape policymaking environment
 (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized?vertical axis in Table
 1). The policymaking environment substantially affects
 contract enforceability between legislators and organized
 interests and hence their lobbying intensity and venue
 choices.
 The above finding has an important policy impli
 cation for reforming electoral and campaign finance
 systems. Because voting, candidate endorsement, and
 campaign donations are the three major instruments of
 contract enforcement for interest groups, electoral re
 forms should be implemented with campaign finance
 reform?e.g., when the electoral system is decentralized,
 interest groups should be able to use a "localized" punish
 ment mechanism which allows them to grant or withdraw
 campaign finance to individual politicians as opposed to
 parties.
 In concluding, we suggest a few promising directions
 for future research. First, an apparent extension of this
 study is to investigate how organizational structures of
 political parties interact with various structures of inter
 est groups to shape their lobbying strategies. Second, it
 will be fruitful to think how our findings on lobbying
 speak to the literature on centralized versus decentralized
 corruption and its relative efficiency. Ackerman (1999,
 chap. 7) and Kang (2002) have both suggested that a
 centralization of the policymaking process can deter "in
 efficient" corruption. This debate has spurred questions
 about whether fiscal and political decentralization leads
 to bad governance and accountability (Treisman 2000).
 Although this article did not concern the efficiency of
 lobbying per se, our findings imply the opposite that
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 decentralization might deter overall lobbying by discour
 aging organized interests to lobby politicians. How elec
 toral systems and political or fiscal decentralization inter
 act to shape representation of organized interests and the
 levels of their political activities, including corruption,
 would thus be a promising line of research. Relatedly, it
 will be fruitful to investigate how the choices of lobbying
 strategies are related to the success of lobbying. Finally,
 general welfare and distributional implications of differ
 ent lobbying strategies under various electoral systems
 need to be discussed.
 Appendix
 A Note on Sampling Procedure
 The sampling was done in two stages. The first stage was
 extensive interviews with bureaucrats on which inter
 est groups played important roles in policymaking and
 policy implementation in various ministries. The survey
 team chose 112 interest groups based on these interviews.
 The second stage was to list interest groups that were not
 mentioned by bureaucrats but who have played an impor
 tant role in policymaking/implementation by searching
 through newspaper archives, Diet testimony, and the An
 nual Report of Organized Groups in Japan (Nihon Dan
 tax Nenkan) published every year. An additional 300 or
 so were chosen through this procedure, giving the total
 of 450 groups as the universe of cases. They contacted
 450 groups for the survey, and 252 groups agreed to be
 surveyed. The second and third surveys replicated this
 process in addition to keeping as much of the same inter
 est groups that were surveyed during the first period and
 obtained 247 and 235 groups agreeing to be surveyed.
 The sampling procedure described above may be
 problematic if our question concerns which interest
 groups are more influential than others as it explicitly
 selects important and active interest groups. The proce
 dure is less problematic for the purpose of our article
 however, as we are interested in who lobbies politicians
 versus bureaucrats when interest groups have a choice in
 influencing bureaucrats or politicians.
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